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NO-FAULT FOR NORTH CAROLINA-A PENDING
PROPOSAL
ROBERT

G.

BYRDt

THE FAULT CONCEPT

Automobile accidents and the injuries caused by them have become
a major problem in our society. Over the years a recognition of the need
to provide a system of reparations for personal injuries and property
damage that arise out of automobile accidents has evolved. The reparation system in effect in North Carolina and most other states is the tort
or fault system. To recover compensation under the fault system, an
injured person must show that his injury was caused by the negligence
of the person from whom he seeks recovery.
Traditionally, the primary function of the fault system has been to
allocate losses between persons involved in accidents; compensation for
injuries, although significant, has been incidental to this basic function.
Increasingly, however, the need to provide compensation for
automobile-accident victims has been identified as an important objective in itself. Recognition of this need is evidenced in North Carolina
by the adoption of financial responsibility laws,' compulsory liability
insurance, 2 legislative provision that uninsured-motorist coverage be
made available to the public, 3 and the general availability of medicalpayment coverage. Further, these responses are simply indicia of the
mounting public concern about the plight of automobile-traffic victims,
both as individuals and as a composite group of our society that is
constantly increasing in size.
In addition to loss allocation and compensation, deterrence has
been an objective that many believe the fault system helps to achieve.
Faulty driving is a major factor that threatens public safety, and a
system that places the burden of losses on the faulty driver may serve
to deter such conduct. Such an allocation of losses not only may affect
the future conduct of the individual upon whom this burden is placed
but also may serve as a deterrent to faulty driving generally.
The incompatibility of these broad objectives has surfaced as
greater emphasis has been placed upon the need for compensation. To
tProfessor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 20, art. 9A (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
Id. ch. 20, art. 13 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
31d. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1971).
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the extent that reimbursement of losses is conditioned on fault, a large
number of injured persons are automatically excluded from receiving
compensation. The tort system is not even called into operation in many
situations, such as accidents involving only a single person, in which
personal injuries are sustained. In other situations a result of effective
performance of the function of loss allocation is a denial of compensation to the injured person. These instances include cases in which proof
of the other person's negligence is insufficient and those in which the
injured person's own negligence has contributed to cause his injury.
The incompatibility of these objectives is further increased when
the theory of the system is put into practice. When the right to receive
compensation is conditioned on fault, whether fault exists becomes a
major determination that must be made. This means that in most cases
an investigation of the facts and circumstances must be made, that these
facts and circumstances must be evaluated, and that a judgment about
the presence or absence of fault must be rendered. These things are
likely to be done whether or not the case is litigated. In some of these
instances attorneys will be retained. In some extended negotiations will
occur. In a smaller number, a civil suit will be brought, and the decision
about recovery will not be made until a trial is held. All of these procedures take time. What all this means, of course, is that significant delay
will occur in many instances between the time of injury with its consequences of medical bills and loss of wages and the time the injured
person is compensated.
These same procedures, which are fairly standard in the operation
of the fault system, have other consequences as well. They are expensive
to the injured person, to the one against whom recovery is sought, to
insurance companies and to the state. Although"these facts will not be
fully explored, the observation can be made that under the fault system
both direct and indirect costs absorb a large amount of funds, a part of
which might otherwise be used for compensation of personal injuries.
The conflict of goals can be illustrated by another example. When
state law requires that all motorists carry liability insurance, the objective of compensating victims of automobile accidents is furthered. The
existence of liability insurance assures the injured person who is entitled
to recover for his losses that funds will be available to compensate him.
However, if it is assumed that placing liability on the faulty driver is an
effective way to deter accidents-an assumption that is debatable, it
seems fairly apparent that this deterrent is substantially weakened when
the insurance company, rather than the faulty driver, pays the bill.
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In determining the thrust of the reparations system in the
automobile-accident area, a basic policy decision must be made as to
which of these objectives is to be primary. The fault system has come
under heavy attack in recent years. Although the major emphasis in the
fault system is upon fairness in allocating losses between individuals,
serious questions have been raised about whether tort doctrine is in fact
the principal factor that affects allocation of losses arising out of automobile accidents.' The questioning has been far-ranging: the concept of
negligence is vague; the reconstruction of an accident through witnesses
with poor opportunity to observe long after it occurred is haphazard;
the presence of insurance causes juries to ignore the fault requirement;
the framework in which settlements are made by insurance companies,
while affected by the legal structure, is influenced by many nonlegal
factors.
A more critical question, however, is whether, in light of the number of persons injured in automobile accidents and the consequences of
these injuries to victims and their families, the fault system can provide
an effective and efficient means of compensation for personal injuries.
Studies have shown that less than one-half of those injured in automobile accidents receive compensation through the tort system.' These
studies also show that compensation under the tort system is incom-

plete' and inequitable.7 They reflect a rather consistent pattern under
which small claims are overcompensated and more serious claims are
'Criticisms of the fault system are summarized in R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 15-34 (1965) [hereinafter cited as KEETON & O'CONNELL].

'The Conard Study in Michigan showed that only 37% of those who suffered economic loss

in automobile accidents received compensation from a tort claim. Of those more seriously injured,
only 55% received payment under tort law. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ, & R.
BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS table 4-11 at 149, figure 6-5 at 188
(1964) [hereinafter cited as CONARD, et al.]. The Morris and Paul study in Philadelphia showed
that less than 55% received compensation through the tort system. Morris & Paul, The Financial
Impact of Autonobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913, figure I at 917 (1962). The Department
of Transportation study indicated that 52% of the injured persons who received compensation from
some source received no tort recovery. I U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND

COMPENSATION

STUDY,

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT

INJURIES 47 (1970).

'E.g.. the Conard study indicates that only 53% of economic loss suffered in automobile
accidents is compensated from any source and that only 55% of this compensation comes from
tort settlements. CONARD, et al. 152-53, table 4-9 at 147.
The Morris and Paul study showed that one-half of all claimants received compensation for
less than 50% of their economic loss and that about one-third received more than twice the amount
of their economic loss in tort recoveries. Morris & Paul, supra note 5, at 916-18. Somewhat
comparable data is revealed in the Conard study. CONARD, et al. 196-98.
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underpaid. 8 Finally, they reveal that the tort system is an inefficient way
to provide compensations for automobile-accident injuries.' Less than
one-half of the insurance-premium dollar for personal injury protection
goes to compensate injured persons. Almost one-half of the amount
used for compensation is applied to compensation for general damages
rather than economic loss.

While general agreement seems to exist that the fault system in its
present form is inadequate, opinion is divided concerning what should
be done. Some advocate that the fault system be replaced with a no-

fault system of reparations; 0 others contend that the fault system should
be modified and retained. In North Carolina, the Governor's Study
Commission on Automobile Insurance and Rates recommended to the
1973 General Assembly a modified no-fault system of reparations." A

bill' 2 incorporating the basic recommendations of the Commission was
passed by the Senate and will be pending in the General Assembly when

it reconvenes in January, 1974. This article reviews the no-fault concept
generally and some provisions of the Commission's proposal in particular.
THE CONCEPT OF NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

The need to provide an effective system of reparations for personal
injuries and property damage that arise out of automobile accidents has
focused nationwide attention on no-fault automobile insurance. A number of states'3 have enacted some form of no-fault statute, and legisla'CONARD, et al. figure 6-14 at 197; Morris & Paul, supra note 5, at 917-18.

'These studies are cited and analyzed in detailed in P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 513-19 (1971).

"E.g.. KEETON & O'CONNELL; AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND EVALUATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND
(1968).
"Eckhardt, No-Fault Legivlation Lacks Humane and Equitable Answers, TRIAL, May-June
1971, at 43: Gillespie & Klipper, Cost or Equity?, TRIAL, July-Aug, 1972. at 39; Lee, Front the
President, TRIAL, May-June 1973, at 7; Preston, The Automobile Needs the Tort System, TRIAL,
May-June 1971, at 44.
12S. 137, 1973 N.C. General Assembly (Engrossed, April 23, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed §
_
].
"CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
38-319 to -351a (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118
(Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN.
627.730 -.741 (Supp. 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90,0§ 34A,
M, N, 0, ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. .§ 24.13101-.13179 (Supp. 1973); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:6A (Supp. 1973).
In addition, a number of states have required insurers to offer first-party coverage whlch may
under a particular statute be either optional or compulsory to motorists. MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A.
538-46 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.26 (Supp. 1973): ORE. REV.
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS
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tion is pending or in preparation in other states. A uniform state law
has been adopted," and proposals for a federal law are being considered.".
Although the no-fault concept is not new to the area of automobile
accident reparations, " only in the last few years has it commanded
serious legislative consideration in this country. The first no-fault statute went into effect in Massachusetts on January 1, 1970.'1 Before and
since that time an inestimable amount of time and energy has been
devoted to its study. Books 8 and articles 9 have been written about it;
legislative commissions"0 and other groups 21 have studied it; and interest
groups have aligned themselves for 2 and against 2 3 it. No-fault has
almost become a household word.
The basic aim of a no-fault system of reparations is to provide
compensation to persons injured in automobile accidents without regard
to fault. Compensation is to be paid even though another person's negligence did not cause the accident and even though the injured person's
negligence caused or contributed to cause-it. A no-fault system of reparations incorporates two basic ideas: (1) abolition of tort liability and (2)
adoption of a substitute method for compensating accident victims. Its
effect is that the individual is protected from suit by others under the
tort system and is provided a means for recovery for his own injury
other than recovery in tort.
STAT.

k§ 743.800-.835 (1971): S.D.

COMPILED LAWS ANN.

"UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS

§§ 58.23-6 to -8(Supp. 1973).
ACT.

'IS. 945, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
"KEETON & O'CONNELL 124-240.

'"Ch. 670, [19701 Mass. Acts 529, amending MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90 (1967) (codified at
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, .§ 34 A, M, N, 0, ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1972)).
"P. GILLESPIE & M. KLIPPER, No-FAULT: WHAT YOU SAVE, GAIN, AND LOSE WITH THE NEW
AUTO INSURANCE (1972); KEETON & O'CONNELL; W. ROKES, NO-FAULT INSURANCE (1971).
"'vniposiun on Nonfaultl Automobile Insurance, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 189 (1971) (contributions from Young, State of New York Insurance Department, Bombaugh, Keeton, O'Connell
Calabresi): S'inposhum: No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 44 Miss. L. REV. 1 (1973) (contributions
from Keeton, Spangenberg, Pearson, Henderson, Magnuson, Coombs, Brainard).
"0'.g.. STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE.

. . FOR

WHOSE BENEFIT? (1970).
2
'E.g.. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS
ASSOCIATION,

(1971);

REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND

AMERICAN INSURANCE

EVALUATE THE KEETON-

O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT PREPARATIONS (1968)
[hercinafter cited as AIA REPORT].
2E.g.. AIA REPORT: ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLANS: THE "No FAULT" PRINCIPLE (1972).

"'See authorities cited note I I supra.
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The subsfitute method of compensation is usually a form of firstparty insurance. The concept of first-party insurance is a familiar one
since it is the traditional form of coverage in accident, hospital, life, and
fire insurance. Further, its use in the automobile accident area is not
new. Collision, medical-payment, and uninsured-motorist coverages are
types of first-party insurance intended to protect the insured against
losses from persoal injury or property damage that arise out of automobile accidents. Under the tort system now in effect in North Carolina a
motorist is required by law to purchase liability insurance for the protection of others who may be injured by his negligent driving.24 Under a
no-fault system he purchases insurance basically for the protection of
himself and the members of his family.
The central thrust of no-fault is prompt and certain compensation
to automobile accident victims. The aim is to provide immediate compensation as losses caused by injury accrue in order to avoid undue
hardship to the injured person and members of his family.
Compensation is paid for economic losses only. Losses for which
compensation is provided in most plans include medical and hospital
expenses, loss of wages, expenses incurred for services that the injured
person would have performed for the benefit of himself and his family
but for the injury, and funeral expenses. Less frequently provision is
made for recovery of economic losses of a decedent's survivors. Firstparty benefits are not provided for pain and suffering, physical impairment, and other general damages.
Most statutes and plans now in existence modify the pure no-fault
concept. Restrictions may be placed upon the types of losses to be
compensated, the total benefits to be paid, and in some instances, upon
the amounts to be paid for particular types of losses. For example, total
first-party benefits are limited to five thousand dollars in Florida 2 and
Connecticut," two thousand dollars in Massachusetts 2 and approximately ten thousand dollars, exclusive of medical expenses, in New
Jersey.28 Limitations upon wage loss and replacement service loss may
restrict recovery to a stated percentage of the actual loss incurred, to a
fixed weekly or monthly amount, to a limited time period, or to some
-'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309(a) (1965).
21FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1972).
-'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-320(d) (Supp. 1973).
-'MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1972).

N.J. STAT.

ANN.

§ 39:6A-4 (Supp. 1973).
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combination of the above. 29

The absence of complete abolition of tort liability is another modification of the pure no-fault concept made in existing plans and statutes.

For the most part, tort exemption for economic losses exists only to the
extent that such losses have been compensated by first-party benefits.30
In addition, immunity from suit to recover general damages is provided

only for less serious injuries. The injured person may maintain a tort
action to recover general damages when he has sustained a serious

injury 31 and, under some plans, when medical expenses incurred by him
in connection with his injury exceeds a fixed sum, such as five hundred
or one thousand dollars.32 Usually, if either the serious injury or medical expense threshold is met, no restriction is placed upon the amount

of general damages that may be recovered. 3
-'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-320(e) (Supp. 1973) (compensation for work loss, defined to
include wage loss and replacement services loss, is limited to 85% of the value of such loss; also
combined benefits for work loss and survivor's loss may not exceed $200 per week); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2) (Supp. 1972) (compensation for earnings loss and reasonable replacement services expense is limited only by the $10,000 ceiling on all benefits); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.736(l)(b) (Supp. 1972) (insured can recover all reasonable replacement services loss
and 100% of any loss of gross income unless income loss recovery is deemed not includible in gross
income for federal income tax purposes, in which event insured is limited to 85% recovery of income
loss). MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1972) (compensation for wages actually lost by
reason of the injury and for replacement services loss is limited by the $2,000 overall ceiling on
personal injury protection benefits; also weekly wage loss benefits cannot exceed 75% of the
insurcd's weekly wages); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13107(b) (Supp. 1973) (replacement services loss
is limited to $20 per day for a maximum period of 3 years; wage loss compensation is limited to
85% of insured's income unless he can show the tax advantage is less than 15%; wage loss recovery
is further limited in that such benefits combined with other earned income cannot exceed $1000
for a single 30-day period; also work loss recovery cannot be had after 3 years from the date of
the accident). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 (Supp. 1973) (Wage loss benefits are limited to
$100/week and $5,200 total per person; replacement services loss compensation to injured parties
is limited to $I2/day with a maximum total recovery per person of $4,380).
"CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-323 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(l) (Supp.
1972): Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1972); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13135(2) (Supp.
1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (Supp. 1973).
'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-323 (Supp. 1973) (somewhat similar to Florida); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.737(2) (Supp. 1972) (injury or disease consist in whole or in part of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to weight-bearing bone, a compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed
fracture, loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability, permanent loss of a bodily function, or death); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1972) (somewhat
similar to Florida); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13135 (Supp. 1973) (death, serious impairment of
body function or permanent serious disfigurement); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (Supp. 1973)
(somewhat similar to Florida).
2'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-323 (a)(7) (Supp. 1973) ($400); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737
(2) (Supp. 1972) ($1,000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1972) ($500); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6A-8 (Supp. 1973) ($200 exclusive of hospital expenses, x-rays, and other diagnostic
medical expenses).
3See notes 98-101 infra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

In the change from a tort to a no-fault system, a number of basic
shifts will occur. One difference, already noted, is that the motorist will
purchase insurance primarily for the protection of his own interests
rather than for the benefit of others whom he may negligently injure.
Under a no-fault system a significant increase in the number of persons
who receive compensation will probably occur." Persons injured in
single-car accidents and those who negligently contributed to cause their

own injuries, although barred from recovery under the tort system, will
be entitled to compensation. Estimates about the increase in the level
of claim frequency have varied considerably. "'
Balanced against the increased amounts that will be paid in com-

pensation are savings that will arise from other features of a no-fault
system. A reduction in investigative, administrative, and litigation costs
should occur"6 so that the amount available for payment of economic
losses will be greater. The limitation upon recovery of general damages
will make additional funds available for payment of economic losses."
A

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL

PartialAbolition of Tort System.

The Commission's proposal partially abolishes tort liability '" and
substitutes for that part abolished first-party insurance as the method
for compensating persons injured in automobile accidents. 31 Under it
a person injured in an automobile accident can receive compensation for
"Mr. Dale R. Comey, associate actuary for the Hartford Insurance Group, in an unpublished
memorandum of June 8, 1972 estimated an increase in claim frequency of appropriate 50% if a
Florida-type no-fault plan went into effect in North Carolina.
"ln preparing cost estimates for a plan under consideration by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Allstate actuary projected an increase in claim frequency of
80% to 100%, the American Mutual Insurance Alliance actuary estimated an increase of 65%, and
the American Insurance Association actuary estimated an increase of 27%. These estimates appear
in an unpublished statement of opinion by the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, the National
Association of Independant Insurers, and State Farm Mutual Insurance Company which is entitled
"'Estimated Effect on Automobile Insurance Premiums of Shifting from the Present System td the
UMVARA System."
• AIA REPORT, exhibit I, sheet 3: Harwayne, Inlsurance Costs of Basic Protection Plan il
Michigan, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 479, 480-82.
17Mr. Dale R. Comey, associate actuary for the Hartford Insurance Group, in an unpublished
memorandum of June 8, 1972 estimated that the percentage of loss costs for pain and suffering to
total costs under the present system would be reduced from 56.3% to 25% if a Florida-type nofault plan were in effect in North Carolina.
-'Proposed § 58A-6.
h91il.
.§ 58A-3,-8.
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his injuries without regard to the presence or absence of fault.4 0 The
insured is protected from suit by others under the tort system and is
provided a means for recovery for his own injury against his own insurance company.
The proposal seeks to provide immediate compensation as losses
caused by injury accrue. Compensation is payable when reasonable
proof of a claim is filed with an insurer, and claims are overdue if not
paid within thirty days.4 The insurer must pay interest of one and onehalf per cent a month on overdue payment 2 and, if suit is necessary to
3
enforce payment, reasonable attorney fees incurred by the claimant.1
First-PartyBenefits A vailable Under Act.
An injured person can recover a maximum of five thousand dollars
in first-party benefits44 under insurance every motorist is required to
buy." Additional benefits are available on an optional basis.4" The injured person cannot maintain a tort action to recover for economic
losses in an amount of five thousand dollars or less. If economic losses
over five thousand dollars are sustained, the injured person may sue in
47
tort to recover for losses in excess of that amount.
Compensation is to be paid for economic losses only; no benefits
are provided for pain and suffering and other general damages.48 Recovery of general damages in tort is also precluded unless the medical
expenses of the injured person exceed one thousand dollars,49 or a serious injury is incurred by him.5" When either threshold is met, no restriction is placed upon the amount to be recovered in general damages in a
tort action.
Basic reparation benefits are made primary except for workmen's
Ijd. § 58A-4.
"Id. § 58A-18(a).
'-Id. § 58A-18(b).
"Id. § 58A-19(a).
"Id. § 58A-2(e).
1Id. § 58A-8.
I'ld. § 58A-13.
1;1d. §k 58A-2(e), -6(a).
"Id. § 58A-2(c).
"The amount was reduced to $750 by amendment in the Senate. Id. § 58A-6(b).
',A serious injury exists when "the injury is a permanent one or results in death, permanent
disfigurement, loss of a body member, permanent loss or impairment of a body function (including
but not limited to sight, hearing, taste and smell), permanent physical or mental impairment, or
more than two months of inability of the injured person to work in an occupation." Id.
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compensation. 5' The injured person's benefits are not to be reduced by
payments that he receives from accident and health insurance, wagecontinuation plans, or other collateral sources even though the pay52
ments are made because of injury in an automobile accident.
Extent of Protection Afforded by Insurance.
The insured and members of his family residing in the same household are covered by the insured's policy in all in-state and out-of-state
accidents." The occupant of a car, if he is not an insured under another
policy, is covered in in-state and out-of-state accidents by the security
on the vehicle of which he is an occupant.' 4 A pedestrian or other person,
who is not the occupant of a car or an insured under another policy, is
covered in in-state accidents only by the security on any vehicle involved
in the accident.55" In case of commercial, passenger-carrying vehicles "
and vehicles furnished by employers,5 7 the security on the vehicle will
always be the primary source of payments to injured occupants.
Benefits for Vehicle Damage.
In relation to damage to motor vehicles, the act again partially
abolishes the tort system and substitutes for the part abolished firstparty insurance as the method for compensating for vehicle damage."
The owner of a motor vehicle must provide protection against damage
to his vehicle of five hundred dollars or less and can maintain an action
in tort against a person at fault in causing the accident only for damages
in excess of that amount. The owner has two options available to him. "
He may obtain full collision coverage for his car or he may secure
coverage that will entitle him to compensation only if another person
was at fault in causing the damage to his vehicle. Regardless of which
option he elects, he will have no tort action for damages of five hundred
dollars or less. The second or "fault" option is designed to give the
owner a right to compensation when such a right would have existed
W'Id. § 58A-2(d)(I).
5Id. § 58A-2(d)(3).
5-1id..
58A- I(a)(2), -3, -5(c)(1).
"Id. .k 58A-3, -5(c)(2).
"Id. . 58A-3, -5(c)(3).
11Id. § 58A-5(a).
5Id. § 58A-5(b).
"Id. §§ 58A-33(a), (c).
59ld. § 58A-33(b).
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under the tort system and can be obtained at relatively low premium
rates.
The act affects only vehicle damage and leaves damage to property
other than vehicles within the tort system.
Requirements Relating to Insurance.
The requirement for security for basic reparation benefits applies
to all types of motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions, and includes
passenger cars and commercial vehicles.'" The owner of a motorcycle
may elect to exclude first-party benefits from insurance coverage on the
notorcycle.5 '
Basic reparation security must be provided for all vehicles operated
in the state and not just for vehicles registered in North Carolina."
First-party vehicle damage insurance must be provided by owners of
vehicles required to be registered in North Carolina."
The act does not affect provisions of existing law which require
liability insurance for personal injury and property damage caused by
the insured's negligence.
The North Carolina motorist would be required to provide security
for payment of basic reparation benefits, for damage to his own vehicle,
and residual liability insurance to provide compensation to others for
personal injury or property damage for which no tort exemption is
provided in the act. Of course, all of this coverage will be available in a
single policy. As a substantial part of personal injury and vehicle damages is removed from the tort system by the Act, the residual liability
insurance will be much cheaper than existing liability insurance.
Subrogation.
Under the proposal only a limited right of subrogation is available
to the insurer that has paid first-party benefits for personal injury 4 or
vehicle damage."' No claim for subrogation arises or can be contracted
for except when the person who suffered loss has a tort action against
"',,Motor vehicle' means a vehicle of a kind required to be registered under Article 3 of
Chapter 20 of the North Carolina General Statutes." Id. § 58A-I(a)(5).
6I. § 58A-8(c).
''1d. § 58A-33(a).
"'Id. § 58A-7(a), (b).
'ld. § 58A-33(c)(5), (d).
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the wrongdoer causing the loss. Thus, to the extent that tort exemption
is authorized, no subrogation claim exists.
MAJOR QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN COMMISSION'S NO-FAULT PROPOSAL

Benefits To Be Provided.
The Commission's proposal limiting benefits to economic loss reflects the view that the losses that are critical to the injured person are
his out-of-pocket losses. The limitation also recognizes that many
losses, such as pain and suffering, representing non-economic detriment
are difficult to measure both in determining the extent of the loss and
in placing a monetary value upon it. These characteristics of noneconomic detriment not only pose obvious practical difficulties under a
first-party system but also present a real danger that a nuisance-value
payment for pain and suffering would become a part of the reparations
system just as it has under the tort system.
The Commission's proposal, like most other statutes and plans,
provides for reimbursement of (1) medical and hospital expenses, (2)
income and wage loss, (3) replacement service loss, and (4) funeral
expenses." Provision is also made for reimbursement of (5) survivors'
economic loss. 7
The Commission adopted a five thousand dollar limit on total firstparty benefits 8 to be provided under compulsory insurance. 9 This limit
is an amount within which the losses of a large majority of accident
victims will fall. A Michigan study indicated that sixty-four percent of
persons involved in automobile accidents suffered losses of less than five
hundred dollars and that losses of ninety-three percent were less than
three thousand dollars.7" A study in Philadelphia showed that losses of
sixty-eight percent were below three hundred dollars and those of
ninety-two percent below three thousand dollars. 71 A closed claim study
in seven states by the American Insurance Association indicated 7 that
losses of seventy-nine percent were less than five hundred dollars. 1
No restriction is placed upon the amount to be paid for any type
'Id. § 58A-2(b)(I)-(4).
'1d. §§ 58A-2(b)(5), (6).
"Id. § 58A-2(e).
-1d. § 58A-8.
et al., supra note 5, at 2.
T
Morris & Paul, supra note 5, at 933-34.
7-AIA REPORT, supra note 21, exhibit X.
"'CONARD,
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of loss except for funeral expenses for which benefits are limited to 750
dollars73 and for wage loss which is limited to eighty-five percent of
gross income if the benefits are held not to be taxable income. 74 The
Commission rejected other limitations upon recovery of first-party benefits. This seems justified because limitations that exclude from firstparty coverage losses for a prescribed period after injury and that fix
maximum dollar limits upon benefits for medical expenses, work loss,
and replacement services may operate to allocate these excess losses to
the injured person. This result will clearly follow if tort exemption is
provided for them. Even if tort exemption does not extend to these
uncompensated losses, the practical possibility of the injured person
enforcing payment of them seems slight. A decision to place these losses
upon the injured person does not seem justified by any premium savings
that might result from such limitations. A second but equally undesirable possibility is that a failure to establish tort exemption for these
excess losses will create many small claims which because of their nuisance value, will carry forward some of the abuses now existing in the
tort system.
In contrast, the limit of wage loss benefits to eighty-five percent of
gross income seems justifiable. Since an individual's wages are subject
to income tax while first-party benefits for wage loss are not, this limitation will not as a practical matter have the effect of requiring the injured
person to absorb part of his own loss. The percentage limitation is a
conservative one and for most individuals the amount received to reimburse wage loss is likely to exceed the take-home pay, after taxes, that
he would have received had he continued to work. If no limitation is
placed upon wage loss recovery the injured person will receive more
from first-party benefits than he would have received from earnings. In
light of these facts, the significant reduction in premiums for first-party
coverage that will result from the limitation seems to warrant its adoption.
The limitation upon the amount to be recovered for funeral expense
is consistent with other statutes and plans. In other statutes the amount
of the limit varies from five hundred to two thousand dollars. Any
amount fixed is somewhat arbitrary. The question will probably be
raised whether 750 dollars, even when combined with benefits available
from social security, will provide an adequate amount for funeral expen"Proposed § 58A-2(b)(2).
71ld. § 58A-2(d)(2).
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ses. However, if no limit is placed upon benefits for funeral expenses or
if the limit is fixed too high, a real danger exists that their availability
will cause an unjustifiable increase in the costs of funerals.
The Commission's proposal does not limit benefits for wage loss
to wages earned at the time of the injury. It provides for reimbursement
of what the injured person would have been able to earn at the time the
loss accrues had he not been injured.75
The proposal provides benefits for survivors when the injured person dies from injury arising out of the use or maintenance of a motor
vehicle." To authorize recovery of survivors' benefits on the no-fault
principle carries through the idea of providing immediate reparation for
economic loss arising out of automobile accidents. The need for reparations without delay seems as great in case of death as it does in case of
injury.
Prompt Payment of Benefits.

The central thrust of no-fault is prompt and certain compensation
to automobile accident victims. The objective is to provide periodic
payments so that benefits are received on a continuing basis as medical
expenses and wage loss are incurred. The overall goal is to place the
injured person as nearly as possible in the same position he would have
been in had no injury occurred so that undue hardship to him and the
members of his family is avoided.
A number of provisions in the proposal are designed to achieve this
goal. Loss is not determined at the time of injury but as expenses are
incurred or work is not performed because of the injury." Compensation
is payable when reasonable proof of a claim is filed with an insurer and
claims are overdue if not paid within thirty days.7" The insurer must pay
interest of one and one-half per cent a month on overdue payments 8
and, if suit is necessary to enforce payment, reasonable attorney fees
incurred by the claimant.'" Restrictions are placed upon lump sum and
installment awards in an attempt to assure that they are consistent with
the above objectives or otherwise in the interest of the injured persons.'
-1d. § 58A-2(b)(3).
7-d. § 58A-2(b)(5), (6).
"Id. § 58A-18(a).
711d.
-9d. § 58A-18(b).
"Id. § 58A-19(a).
-11d. § 58A-21.
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A number of provisions are intended to ensure that benefits are in
fact received by the injured person. Generally, rights to future benefits
are not assignable.82 Subject to limited exceptions, benefits are exempt
from execution or garnishment to the extent that applicable state or
federal law provides for exemption to wages.8 Benefits are to be paid
without any deduction or set-off by the insurer."
The proposal also contains discovery provisions to ensure that information relevant to a claim is readily accessible so that benefits may
be determined accurately and paid promptly. Since benefits are provided for economic losses only and these losses are susceptible to satisfactory proof, the discovery provisions should go far to eliminate disputes about the extent and amount of loss that has been sustained.
The proposal provides for the medical examination of the injured
person who claims first-party benefits. 85 Although some no-fault statutes require a claimant, upon request by an insurer, to submit to medical
examination, the Commission's proposal does not make submission of
the claimant to medical examination mandatory. Instead, provision is
made for petition to a court with opportunity for notice and hearing on
the determination of the need for examination and the extent of disclosure to be made. Insurers are required to provide copies of medical
reports to the insured.
Employers are required to furnish, upon request of the claimant or
insurer, statements of the work record and earnings of an employee
upon whose injury the claim is based. 8 The claimant is required to
submit to an insurer reports of medical treatment and examination, to
give the names of attending physicians, and to authorize inspection by
the insurer of relevant medical records. 8 Again, the purpose of the
provisions is to provide ready access to information relevant to a claim
for benefits and to facilitate determination and processing of claims.
The goal of prompt and certain compensation for accident victims
is furthered by the ease with which an injured person can file a claim
for benefits. However, a problem arises because an injured person may
be covered by more than one policy of insurance. Overlapping coverage
may exist because the injured person is under a policy of his own or of
"Id. § 58A-23.
-1d. § 58A-25.
"'Id. § 58A-24.
-1d. § 58A-26.
Id. § 58A-27(a)(1).
'Id. § 58A-27(a)(2).
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a member of his household and in addition is protected by the security
on the vehicle of which he is an occupant or by which he is struck.
One solution to the problem is to place primary responsibility on
the insurer of the vehicle in which the injured person was an occupant
or by which he was struck.88 The insured and members of his household
look to his insurer for protection only when injured in an accident
involving the insured vehicle or a vehicle that was uninsured. This approach focuses upon the involvement of the vehicle in accidents as the
basis for allocating liability to insurers. Perhaps, some thought exists
that "involvement in accidents" roughly parallels fault and thus tends
to place the loss on the basis of responsibility for the injury. As a
solution to this problem the Commission adopted a system under which
in the majority of cases the insured and members of his family will
proceed against the insured's own insurer to recover compensation for
injury.89 A major advantage of this arrangement is that the injured
person files his claim with an agent with whom he customarily deals
rather than one who is a stranger to him.
Although the Commission adopted the principle that the injured
person should make claim for benefits against his own insurer, two
exceptions to this principle are made. The insurer of a vehicle used in
the business of transporting fare-paying passengers is primarily liable
for claims arising from injury to passengers in the vehicle. Thus, a
passenger in a bus or taxicab will recover from the insurer of that vehicle
rather than his own insurer. The insurer of a vehicle furnished by an
employer to this employee is primarily liable for claims arising from
injury to the employee while an occupant of the vehicle." These exceptions represent a policy decision that the owners of these vehicles should
bear the costs of injury to occupants under these circumstances.
Tort Exemption and Limitation of Liability.

In any attempt to establish a first-party system of reparations for
automobile-accident victims the relationship between that system and
the existing tort system must be determined. No existing statute or plan
has completely substituted the first-party system of reparations for the
tort system. A number of statutes 2 leave the tort system completely
''E.g..MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1972).
"Proposed § 58A-5(c).
1"Id. § 58A-5(a).
"Id. § 58A-5(b).
"See jurisdictions cited supra note 13, second paragraph.
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intact so that a cause of action continues to exist for both economic
losses and general damages sustained by the injured person. Usually,
under these statutes provision is made for reduction of the tort recovery
by amounts received in first-party benefits for economic losses or for
subrogation of the first-party insurer that has paid these benefits to the
rights of the injured person against the tortfeasor to the extent of payments made by it.
Four approaches, or some combination of them, have been taken
in regard to the restriction of recovery in tort of general damages: (1)
no modification of the right to recover general damages in a tort action;9 3 (2) a limitation upon the amount that may be recovered in
general damages;9 4 (3) an exclusion from recovery in tort of a fixed
dollar amount in general damages;95 and (4) a provision that establishes
a threshold that must be met before any recovery for general damages
is allowed." Two types of thresholds have been adopted and both are
commonly provided for in the same statute. One permits the recovery
of general damages only when a serious injury is shown to exist. The
other is keyed to the amount of medical expenses incurred by the injured
person. The basic purpose of either type of threshold is to attempt to
identify cases in which claims of general damages are likely to be genuine and of enough magnitude to be recognized.
Under a first-party system of reparations an increase in the amount
of compensation paid will result because of increase in the frequency of
claims." Increased claim frequency is due to the payment of benefits to
persons who could not collect under the tort system-those unable to
prove fault of another person, the victim of the single-car accident, and
the person barred from recovery because of his own negligence. If increased amounts of compensation are to be paid, one of two things must
occur. Either premium costs must increase or a savings must be effected.
Savings can be effected through lower costs incident to the administration of a first-party system.98 Traditionally, costs of administering
reparations for automobile-accident victims under the tort system have
been high, and a complete or partial shift from the tort system to a first'4DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1972).
"An Illinois statute, held unconstitutional in Grace v. Howlett, 51 I1. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474
(1972), limited general damages to a percentage of medical expenses incurred by the injured person.
'"UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT § 5.
11S.ee notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
"See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
I'See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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party system is likely to reduce costs in relation to attorneys' fees,
adjustment expenses, and the bargain value of many small claims that
have been consistently overpaid under the tort system. Whether these
same savings can be realized under a first-party system in which full tort
liability is retained is uncertain. Since under these circumstances both
the fault and general damages issues remain, a confident projection of
cost savings clearly cannot be made. It would seem that cost savings can
be realized only if the injured person, once he received compensation
from first-party benefits, voluntarily chose not to pursue his tort remedy.
Significant savings under a no-fault system of reparations can be
realized through a limitation of recovery of general damages." The
decision to restrict the recovery of general damages is not simply a
choice that prefers reimbursement of economic loss over compensation
of general damages. Undoubtedly this choice would be a significant part
of a decision to abolish completely the right to sue for general damages.
However, it is likely that nuisance-value payments are reflected in the
rather consistent overpayment of small claims under the tort system and
that these payments constitute an important part of the sums that are
used for compensation of general damages. To the extent that these
payments can be directed to the payment of economic loss a more
effective reparations system can be achieved without depriving injured
persons of compensation for real losses they have sustained.
Again, if no restriction is placed upon the recovery of general
damages, the likelihood that these savings can be realized is substantially reduced and depends totally upon the choice of the injured person
whether to pursue his tort claim.
Another possible consequence of a plan that provides first-party
benefits without placing any restriction upon tort suits should be noted.
Its effect upon injured persons' pursuit of the tort remedy is likely to
be uneven. Two factors seem crucial in determining the likelihood
whether an injured person might pursue his tort remedy. Education and
status are likely to affect significantly the individual's knowledge of his
tort claim and of the means available to pursue it. Earnings level is
likely to affect both the incentive for and the practical feasibility of
pursuit of any tort claim.
The Commission's proposal limits recovery of general damages by
adoption of a serious injury and a medical threshold.' 0 In this way an
"'See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
'"'Proposed § 58A-6(b).
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attempt is made to provide immunity from suit for general damages for
less serious injuries only. The injured person may maintain a tort action
to recover general damages when he has sustained a serious injury or
when medical expenses incurred by him in connection with his injury
exceed one thousand dollars.'"' If either the serious injury or the medical
threshold is met, no restriction exists upon the amount of general damages to be recovered. These thresholds, it is believed, preserve a tort
action for larger claims in which general damages are likely to be a
significant part of the loss the injured person has sustained.
Questions have been raised about the constitutionality of no-fault
in general and about the threshold provision in particular. However,
existing legal precedents support the view that the no-fault concept in
the Commission's proposal is constitutional. The Massachusetts nofault statute, which is similar to the Commission's proposal, denies
recovery for general damages except when a serious injury exists or
when medical expenses exceed a fixed amount. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts statute was constitutional.102
Compulsory workmen's compensation statutes completely abolish the
injured employee's right to sue the employer and certain other persons
in tort, and they have been held constitutional by state courts0 3 and the
United States Supreme Court.'04 Curtailment or elimination of the right
to sue in tort has been held constitutional in other situations in which
no substitute remedy was made available to the injured person. Guest
statutes that permit a gratuitous automobile passenger to sue the driver
only for gross or wilful conduct have been held to be constitutional. 5
"Heart balm" statutes that abolish tort actions for breach of promise,
alienation of affections, seduction, and criminal conversation have also
been held to be constitutional.0 6
The Massachusetts decision' 7 deals squarely with and rejects three
of the arguments that have been used most frequently to attack the
constitutionality of no-fault legislation: (1) the limitation upon recovery
'"The amount was reduced to $750 by amendment in the Senate. Id.
Mass. __, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
"'2Pinnick v. Cleary, "State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 135 P. 645 (1913), cert. denied, 243 U.S.
219 (1917).
'"'Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). New York Cent. R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1917).
'",Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
" Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d 47, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 641 (1937) (no
substantial rederal question).
7
"*
Pinnick v. Cleary, Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
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of general damages is unconstitutional; (2) the use of the medical threshold to limit recovery of general damages is unconstitutional; and (3) a
limitation.upon the common law tort action violates the state constitutional provision that provides for free recourse to the courts and laws.
In this case the plaintiff was unable to meet either the serious injury or
the medical threshold but offered proof to establish general damages in
the amount of eight hundred dollars. He contended that the provisions
of the Massachusetts statute that took away his right to recover these
general damages were unconstitutional. Rejecting all three of the above
contentions, the Court held that the statute provided an adequate substitute for his right to recover for general damages. The right to recover
first-party benefits and the exemption from tort liability were regarded
as a reasonable substitute for the right to sue for general damages.
Although a no-fault statute in Illinois was held unconstitutional by
its trial'0 and appellate' courts, these decisions seem to raise no serious
question about the constitutionality of the Commission's proposal.
Under the Illinois statute, insurance coverage was not compulsory, but
the limitation on the right to recover general damages in tort applied
to all persons. The trial court found this limitation upon tort suit unconstitutionally discriminated against uninsured persons who would have
no right to recover first-party benefits. The court noted that in this
respect the Illinois statute differed critically from the Massachusetts
statute under which insurance was compulsory." 0 Commercial vehicles
were excluded from the provisions of the Illinois statute. The court
found the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against occupants of
commercial vehicles for whom first-party benefits were not provided.
Finally, the trial court held that the provision of the Illinois statute that
limited all general damage recovery to a percentage of medical expenses
was unconstitutional. The Court did not decide whether a medical
threshold was constitutional; instead, it decided that a limitation of
general damages in all cases to a percentage of medical expenses incurred was invalid. This difference may be a crucial one in light of the
fact that insurance was not compulsory and a large percentage of Illinois motorists were uninsured and thus not entitled to recover first-party
benefits.
The objections relied upon by the Illinois trial court do not apply
to the Commission's proposal. The Commission's proposal applies to
'"Gracev. Howlett, Civil No. 71CH4737 (Cir. Ct. of Cook Co., Ill., Dec. 29, 1971).
'"Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill.
2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
110Gracev. Howlett. Civil No. 71CH4737 (Cir. Ct. of Cook Co., Ill., Dec. 29, 1971).
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all vehicles"' and provides for compulsory insurance" 2 and hence neither
of the classifications found objectionable by the court is created by the
proposal.
The grounds for decision in the Illinois Supreme Court'13 seem
equally inapplicable to the Commission's proposal. That court held that
the exclusion of commercial vehicles from the Illinois statute violated a
provision of the Illinois constitution that prohibited special legislation.
The basis for the court's decision was that for purposes of compensation
of automobile-accident victims no valid distinction exists to justify treating commercial and private-passenger vehicles differently. The Court
also held that a provision for mandatory arbitration of certain automobile accident tort claims was unconstitutional because it entailed de
novo proceedings prohibited by the Illinois constitution, because it deprived the parties of a jury trial, and because it created a fee office
contrary to the Illinois constitution. None of these features are present
in the Commission's proposal which applies to all vehicles and contains
no provision that requires arbitration of tort claims.
Persons, Vehicles, and Accidents To Be Covered.
In broad terms the Commission's proposal provides that every
person who suffers loss from injury arising out of the maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle is entitled to first-party benefits." 4 Entitlement
to benefits in no way depends upon the existence of another person's
fault or the absence of fault of the injured person." 5'
To achieve this broad application a number of specific provisions
are necessary. First-party insurance is made compulsory. "' The obligation of insurers to pay is expressly stated to exist without regard to any7
immunity from liability or suit which might otherwise be applicable."
The state, municipal corporations, and other public agencies are required to provide security for the payment of first-party benefits." 8 The
requirement to provide security is made applicable to a nonresident
when his vehicle is operated in the state by him or with his permission."'
"'Proposed § 58A-8.
111d.
"'Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
"'Proposed § 58A-3.
"'ld. § 58A-4(a).
"'Ild.§ 58A-8.
11Id. § 58A-4(b).
"'ld. § 58A-8(a).
"'Id. § 58A-8(c).
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A fund, called the Assigned Claims Fund, is created to provide a source
of compensation for injured persons when insurance or other security
is not available for payment of their losses.""
Several important reasons exist for extending the application of the
no-fault principle to nonresidents. The primary purpose of partially
replacing tort law with a no-fault plan is to provide a more efficient and
effective compensation system. Although North Carolina's main concern is with its residents, it also has an interest in providing a better
compensation system for non-residents who are injured in North Carolina. Another important objective is to provide tort exemption to North
Carolina residents for injuries they negligently inflict upon nonresidents.
A reduction in the impact of the no-fault plan is likely if it is not
extended to cover the nonresident since nonresidents will have tort actions against negligent residents, and residents will have tort actions
against negligent nonresidents.
To provide that the proposal shall apply to nonresidents who come
into the state may pose no serious legal problem. Today the nonresident
who comes into North Carolina is subject to its tort law. Whether or
not he has liability insurance, he is obligated to pay damages for injuries
to others he negligently causes. Further, the compulsory liability insurance laws of North Carolina are made applicable to nonresidents after
a waiting period prescribed by statute.' The proposal also provides that
liability insurance policies covering vehicles of nonresidents are converted into security for payment of first-party benefits.' A question
23
about the legality of this particular provision may be raised.
The requirement that the state and municipal corporations provide
security for the payment of first-party benefits is consistent with the
objectives of the proposed statute. To exclude the State and municipal
corporations from the proposal seems unjustified in light of the recognition of the need for a more effective reparations system for compensation of automobile accident victims and of the fact that the system is
made compulsory upon the general public. As the state and its agencies
contribute to and benefit from the motoring activity, they should bear
a fair share of the costs in accident losses that arise from that activity.
Exclusion of the state and its agencies from a no-fault law will reduce
/'Id.
§ 58A-15.
'21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309(a) (1965). Id. § 20-83(b) (Supp. 1971).
'22Proposed § 58A- I (b).
"For a discussion of this issue, see UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLES ACCIDENT REPARATIONS
AcT § 9. Comnment at 34.
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not only the first-party protection available to the general public but
also the exemption from tort liability provided to it. A likely consequence will be a greater financial burden upon individual members of
the general public.
The no-fault principle applies to private-passenger and commercial
vehicles.' 2 1 The Commission's original proposal also required first-party
security for motorcycles also. However, the proposal was later modified
to permit the owner of a motorcycle to elect to exclude from the security
covering the motorcycle all coverage for first-party benefits.2 The primary reason for this change seems to have been a concern that premium
costs for first-party coverage on motorcycles would be so great as to
make insurance practically inaccessible.
First-party benefits are available to all persons injured in automobile accidents occurring in the state." 6 Benefits are provided for losses
incurred in out-of-state accidents for an insured, members of his family
and occupants of an insured vehicle.2 7 Of course, the tort remedy of a
person injured in an accident occurring in another state is determined
by the law of that state.
Under the provisions of the proposal establishing the right to receive first-party benefits, situations will arise in which an injured person
is entitled to receive benefits when no source is available for payment.
This would be the case when a passenger is injured and neither he nor
the owner of the automobile in which he was riding has insurance. It
would also be true when a pedestrian, who is not covered by insurance,
is struck by an uninsured or unidentifiable vehicle.
An Assigned Claims Plan is created to provide a source from which
benefits can be paid in these situations. 2 8 All insurers must participate
in this plan and must share equitably in the costs arising from loss
payments and expenses of operation. Benefits cannot be obtained
through the plan by motorists and members of their family who have
29
failed to obtain insurance as required by law.
The Problem of CollateralSources.
The aim of a reparations system is to compensate for losses caused
''Proposed

§ 58A-I(a)(5), -8.

125d. § 58A-8(c).
1'21d. §
I-Id. §
I'-d. §
'Id. §

58A-3(a).
58A-3(b).
58A-15.
58A-16(a).
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by accidental injury. However, a variety of compensation plans exist in
Noth Carolina and other states, and an injured person may be entitled
to receive compensation from more than one of these sources for the
same injury. When payments are made from several sources, the benefits received may exceed the losses suffered. Generally, duplication of
benefits, to the extent that it results in payments in excess of losses
suffered, is undesirable since it increases the costs of the compensation
plan and may promote malingering.
Statutory compensation plans now in effect include workmen's
compensation, social security, unemployment compensation, and in a
few states,' 0 non-occupational temporary disability benefits. Private
sources of compensation include health, accident, hospital, disability,
and other forms of insurance, wage-continuation plans, gratuities, and
others. These plans have been established separately and in some instances duplication of benefits occur. Under tort law an injured person
generally is permitted to obtain the full amount of his losses from a
tortfeasor although he also receives compensation from collateral
sources for the same injury.' 3' In the area of statutory compensation
plans, concern about duplication of benefits is becoming evident and
increasingly efforts are being made to coordinate benefits received from
several sources. Overcompensation from duplication of benefits from
statutory compensation plans, which are financed through compulsory
charges that, directly or indirectly, are passed on to the public, is difficult to justify. Although increased cost to the public is probably not a
valid objection to duplication of benefits from private sources, it seems
probable that most individuals, if given the opportunity for an informed
choice, would prefer a reduction in premium costs to a duplication of
benefits.
These considerations pose .the question whether provision can be
made in an automobile-accident-reparations plan that will permit insurers to lower premium costs by eliminating duplication of benefits. Two
techniques have been used in other no-fault plans for this purpose. One
is to make automobile-accident reparation benefits secondary to some
or all collateral sources so that no-fault benefits will be reduced to the
extent that losses have been compensated by one of these sources.,"
' 'CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE

§§

2800-04 (West 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§§

43:21-25

to -55

(1962): N.Y. WORKMEN'S ComP. LAW §§ 200-42 (McKinney 1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ,§ 2839-1 to -40, 28-40-1 to -18, 28-41-1 to -32 (1957).
'I'D. DOBBS, REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQUITY, RESTITUTION § 8.10, at 581 (1973).
I'3CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-333(c) (Supp. 1973) (workmen's compensation), DEL. CODE
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Another approach to the elimination of duplication of benefits is to
make optional deductibles available to the insured.13 In theory, the
insured can take into account collateral sources available to him, elect
a deductible in an appropriate dollar amount to reflect these sources of
compensation, and thereby reduce the premiums that he will have to pay
for automobile insurance.
. For the most part, the Commission rejected the idea of including
any coordination of benefits provision in its no-fault proposal. Several
reasons for this rejection may exist. Provision for optional deductibles
in effect permits the insured to modify for himself and members of his
family the requirement for compulsory first-party benefits. This type of
deductible is not tied to the existence of a specified and existing collateral source. Thus while it may serve to permit the insured to eliminate
duplication of coverage, it also gives him the option to remove himself
and members of his family from first-party coverage when he has no
collateral sources of compensation. This feature of the optional deductible substantially reduces its attractiveness if the goal of providing an
effective reparation system remains an important one. The possibility
seems great that many persons, who have a significant need for protection, may elect high deductibles to avoid premium costs. The use of a
deductible contingent upon the actual availability of collateral sources
to the insured has been suggested. 134 However, the practical problems
of ascertaining what collateral sources are available to an insured, what
benefits they provide, what exclusions or deductibles they may be subject to, and how all of this will affect an individual insured's premium
seem too great for such a deductible to be feasible.
Under the Commission's proposal only workmen's compensation
is made primary to first-party, automobile insurance benefits.' 3 Workmen's compensation benefits are a statutory substitute for the emANN. tit. 21, § 2118(f) (Supp. 1972) (workmen's compensation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(4)
(Supp. 1972) (workmen's compensation); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1972) (workmen's compensation); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13109(1) (Supp. 1972) (any benefits required to be
provided under the laws of any state or the federal government); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-6
(Supp. 1973) (workmen's compensation, statutory employees temporary disability benefits, medicare provided under federal law).
"'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(b) (Supp.1972) (deductible authorized but amounts
not specified); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.739 (Supp. 1972) ($250, $500, $1000 deductibles authorized);
MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1972) ($100, $250, $500, $I000, $2000 deductibles authori/ed): MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13109(3) (Supp. 1972) (deductibles up to $300 may be offered; any
others require prior approval of the commissioner).
"'UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT § 14(b)(2).
1'5Proposed .§ 58A-2(d)(1), (3).
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ployee's common law tort action. First-party benefits under the no-fault
plan are also in effect a substitute for the injured person's tort suit.
Under these circumstances duplication of benefits for the same injury
does not seem to be justified. Further, in a broad sense, subordination
of first-party benefits to workmen's compensation has the effect of
placing the costs of injury to employees upon the employer rather than
to finance them through automobile-insurance premiums. The result
will be a reduction in the cost of first-party automobile insurance.
Subrogation.
In some instances an injured person will have two sources of recovery for losses arising out of the maintenance or use of an automobile: a
claim for basic reparation benefits and a cause of action, usually in tort,
against a third person. Under existing law a first-party insurer may be
subrogated to the injured person's rights against the third person to the
extent it has paid losses of the injured person. 3 ' The ultimate effect of
subrogation is to require the third-party wrongdoer to pay the total
amount of the loss by reimbursing the insurer for the amount it has paid
and by paying to the injured person any recovery in excess of the amount
he received from the insurer.
Several considerations bear upon the questions whether to provide
for subrogation in a no-fault plan and, if so, in what way it is to be
effected. The first major consideration is that of cost. The overall costs
of providing reparations to injured persons is increased by subrogation
because additional legal and administrative costs must be incurred to
effect it. Some people assert that subrogation provides little financial
advantage to insurers because over a period of time the benefits and
losses they experience in the absence of subrogation will balance out and
that, for this reason, expenditures made to enforce subrogation rights
cannot be justified.
The second consideration involves the insurance process itself. Proponents of subrogation suggest that subrogation is necessary to place
upon each insurer the risks it has undertaken and to permit effective
rating of drivers by insurers. The suggestion that subrogation is needed
to accomplish proper risk distribution among insurers is probably in
conflict with the contention of opponents of subrogation that the bene'Safeguard Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Cold Storage, 267 N.C. 679, 149 S.E.2d 27 (1966)
(property): Security Fire & Indemnity Co. v. Barnhardt, 267 N.C. 302, 148 S.E,2d 117 (1966)
(collision): General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 647 (1963) (fire).
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fits and losses experienced by insurers in the absence of subrogation will
balance out over a period of time.
Two different situations in which the subrogation question arises
should be identified. In one, tort exemption exists under the no-fault
statute for the person whose fault has caused injury to another person.
In this situation some plans maintain the fault concept at the insurer
level and require the liability insurer of the person at fault to reimburse
137
the insurer that has paid first-party benefits to the injured person.
The other situation in which the subrogation problem arises is when
no tort exemption is granted by the statute to the wrongdoer. Nonexempt persons primarily consist of those connected with the maintenance
or use of a motor vehicle for which basic reparation security has not
been provided, manufacturers, lessors, repairers, and railroads. Most
statutes provide for subrogation or reimbursement of the first-party
insurer in these situations.' 3 SOne argument for maintaining subrogation here is that it brings additional money into the automobilereparation system as the wrongdoer frequently is not a motorist.
The Commission's proposal originally provided for subrogation in
both of these situations. However, the members of the Commission were
divided on the question whether subrogation should exist when the person who caused the accident is immune from tort suit and the proposal
was subsequently amended to limit subrogation to situations in which
139
the injured person has a tort claim.
Vehicle Damage.
The Commission's recommendation includes the provision of firstparty benefits for vehicle damage. The effect of its recommendation is
to abolish partially the tort system and to substitute for the part abolished first-party insurance as the method for compensating for vehicle
damage. Some no-fault statutes exclude vehicle damage from their coverage."" One factor that may have influenced the decision to make this
exclusion is that the savings brought about by a shift from the tort to a
first-party system in relation to personal injury cannot be expected in
relation to physical damage. A second factor may be that first-party
coverage for vehicle damages creates some problems relating to the
"'MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1972).
'E.g.. UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLES ACCIDENT REPARATIONS AcT

"'Proposed § 58A-33(a).
""CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
1973).

§ 38-319

§

6(b).143.

to -351 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 39:6A (Supp.
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availability or cost of insurance in regard to certain commercial vehicles
and to older private-passenger vehicles. Finally, losses arising out of
vehicle damage may be regarded as less critical to the injured person
so that the need to provide prompt and certain compensation is less
urgent.
On the other hand, failure to include vehicle damage will create a
dual system under which personal injury and vehicle damage are handled in different ways. The splitting up of losses that arise out of an
automobile accident creates obvious problems of administration and is
likely to frustrate reasonable expectations of the public in regard to the
system.
Under the Commission's proposal an owner of a vehicle is required
to provide protection for his own vehicle and, if damage is caused to it,
will collect from his own insurer. 4 ' Two options"' are available to the
owner: he may obtain full collision coverage for his vehicle or he may
elect coverage that entitles him to recover from his insurer only if another person's fault caused the damage to his vehicle.' Under the first
option- the owner will be entitled to recover from his own insurer
whether or not another person was at fault in causing the damage to
his vehicle. The second or fault option gives the owner a right to compensation when such a right would have existed under the tort system
and can be obtained at relatively low premiums. Although his right to
recover under this option is conditioned upon the fault of another person, his recovery will be against his own insurance company.
Limited tort exemption is provided for vehicle damage and, regardless of which option an owner elects, he will have no tort action for
damages of five hundred dollars or less.'44 A negligent party remains
liable for vehicle damage in excess of five hundred dollars and will
provide security against this obligation through liability insurance. The
first-party insurer is entitled to reimbursement from the liability insurer
of a person at fault in causing the damage only for amounts paid out
by it in excess of five hundred dollars.'45
The proposal affects only vehicle damage and leaves damage to
property other than vehicles within the tort system.
'Proposed § 58A-33(a).
"At one time the Commission's proposal provided a third option under which the owner could
choose to provide no coverage for his vehicle. This option would in effect give the owner the choice
to become a self-insurer.
'Proposed § 58A-33(b).
"'d.§ 58A-33(c)(5).
'"id. § 58A-33(d).
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SOME OBSERVATIONS

The no-fault idea deserves careful consideration and deliberate decision by the North Carolina legislature. The Commission's proposal is
the product of two years of study and provides full opportunity for
examination of the issues involved. The choice of simple rejection of the
Commission's proposal without any further action for reform of the
automobile-accident reparation system is no longer a viable one. Almost
everyone admits the existence of serious shortcomings in the tort system
and, if the General Assembly is to meet its obligation to the public,
action must be taken to change the existing system. If the Commission's
modified no-fault plafi is rejected, meaningful alternatives for improving
the reparations system must be presented.
Doubt exists whether the needed reform can be achieved by an addon, no-fault plan under which additional first-party coverage is made
compulsory but no modification of the tort system is effected. 4 ' Firstparty coverage in the form of collision, medical-payment, and
uninsured-motorist insurance is already prevalent in the state and, despite its existence, deficiencies in the reparations system remain. Obvious inefficiencies will exist in a dual, overlapping system of first-party
147
and tort coverage.
No-fault can no longer be dismissed as a theoretical scheme for
reform. A recent report indicates that some form of no-fault law now
covers forty-two percent of the nation's population and that coverage
of an additional thirty-four percent of the people will result if pending
legislation, with favorable chances of passage, is enacted.," Further,
preliminary reports on the operation of no-fault plans in other states
suggest that many of the benefits claimed for no-fault can in fact be
realized."' A tentative report on the Florida system shows that claim
processing is more expeditious under no-fault than under the tort system
and that significantly less delay occurs between the time of injury and
the initial receipt of compensation by the injured person.' ° The report
"'An add-on, no-fault bill was introduced in the 1973 General Assembly. S. 226, 1973 N.C.
General Assembly.
"'Some of the difficulties likely to be encountered if modification of the tort system is not
made were discussed earlier. See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
"'lieto Ref!orm in No-Fault Moves Ahead 76% of U.S. Population Covered, TRIAL, JulyAugust 1973, at 5.
"'Coombs, The Massachusetts Experience Under No-fault, 44 Miss. L.J. 158 (1973); Little,
How NoFault Is Working in Florida,59 A.B.A.J. 1020 (1973); Short, No-Fault in Delaware-One
Year Later, TRIAL, Mar.-April 1973, at 53.
""Little, supra note 149, at 1022-3.
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verifies the fact that nuisance-value payments associated with small
claims under the tort system are virtually eliminated under the no-fault
system.' Data available when the report was made also indicates a
substantial reduction in tort claims, in litigation, and in the employment
of attorneys by claimants.' This data, however, is considered incomplete since it suggests that some larger claims, more likely to give rise
to tort recoveries, have not yet been filed-somewhat comparable experiences are revealed in preliminary reports from Massachusetts' and
Delaware.' 4
The primary objective of no-fault is to provide a more efficient and
effective reparations system. The Commission's proposal for a modified
no-fault system is designed to insure that substantially all automobileaccident victims will be compensated for economic losses and that in
case of the seriously injured, in which genuine general damages are
likely to exist, a tort action will be available. The often asserted defense
of the tort sysem that it was never designed to compensate all traffic
victims, while accurate, ignores the recognized need for a reparation
system to provide broader compensation coverage. If the provision of
compensation is identified as a primary objective of the reparation system, this limiting feature of tort law becomes a serious obstacles to its
accomplishment.
No one can question the fact that no-fault will provide more benefits for economic losses. Although savings in administration and claims
costs will be a source of some funds for extended benefits, the major
source of funds for this purpose will probably come from curtailment
in payments for general damages. 5 5 Opponents of no-fault argue that a
limitation upon recovery of general damages merely reduces the compensation" of one victim in order to compensate another. However, this
statement oversimplifies the matter and to call attention to other factors
that bear upon the issue some observations made earlier are repeated
here. The decision to restrict the recovery of general damages is not
simply a choice that prefers reimbursement of economic loss over compensation of general damages. It seems clear that substantial nuisance"'Id. at 1023.
2
11
1d. at 1021-22.
"'See Coombs, supra note 149, at 166-73.
"'Short, supra note 149, at 53.
"Brainard, The Threshold Impact on Injury Victims' Recoveries, TRIAL, July-Aug. 1972, at
32. (Although basically critical of the threshold approach, this article shows the savings realized
by elimination of general damages for small claims.)
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value payments are reflected in the rather consistent overpayment of
small claims and that these payments constitute an important part of
the sums that are used for compensation of general damages. To the
extent that these payments can be directed to the payment of economic
loss a more effective reparations system can be achieved without depriving injured persons of compensation for real losses they have sustained.
Savings in premium costs to the public has probably been overemphasized as a goal to be achieved by a no-fault system. Experience in
Massachusetts' and Florida 57 demonstrates that reduction in premium
costs can be realized; however, additional time is probably needed in
each situation before a complete evaluation of this experience can be
made." Premium savings will result in the operation of the no-fault
system only to the extent that savings exceed the additional amounts
paid out because of the projected increase in claims frequency. In neither Florida nor Massachusetts has the projected increase in claims
frequency occurred. Beyond these considerations, another factor needs
exploration. At some point, if significant savings are realized through
no-fault, reasonable premium levels may be reached and thought should
be given to their utilization for further improvement in the reparation
system. Finally, even if significant premium savings are not realized, nofault still holds the promise for a more effective reparations system
under which prompt compensation will be available and more dollars
will go to compensate for critical economic losses.
"'Coombs, supra note 149, at 166-68.
151TRrAL, Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 41. (A 15% rate reduction went into effect when the Florida law
became effective on January I, 1972 and an additional 11% rate reduction is to become effective
on January 31, 1973.)
'For analysis of some of the uncertainties inherent in the Massachusetts experience, see
Brainard, The Impact of No-Fault on the Underwriting Results of Massachusetts Insurers, 44
Miss. L.J. 174 (1973).

